The article is focus on the conglomerates’ performance manipulation practice. In the real practice, the profit manipulation contributes to the performance manipulation. In addition, the way to the profit manipulation is to accounting methods selection to satisfy the managers’ self interests and influenced over the economic events, the consequence is to impact on the report profit which is not the actual reflection on the operation of the company. Besides that, the article would like to apply the Fligstein’s theoretical framework on strategic action fields (SAFs) to performance manipulation practice. In addition, the article would be divided into 8 sections to analyze respectively.
Section 1: The research on the performance manipulation has two respective. One hand, it could enhance the ability of the group leader to make the rule on the reporting practice; the other hand, the performance manipulation is trend to be collective rather than individual. Each individual has the motivation to performance manipulation, because each has own interests inside. In the term of the collective, the group leader is in the central role in the individual’s reactions and secures the team’s long term cooperation in the reporting manipulation practice.
Section 2: The motivation of the reporting manipulation is for the manager’s own interest which is tied to the job secure and higher salary pay. In addition, the manipulation is the difference between actual performance and expectation in the term of the operation. Besides that, the benefit of the reporting manipulation practice is always associated with the share price benefits in the real practices. Apparently, the managers’ pay has related to the performance of the company normally: salary and bonus. Also, the potential investors are expected the profit manipulation to push the higher price to get the higher return. As a consequence, the manipulation is the expectation of the managers’ and shareholders’.
Section3: In the model of the SAFs, the actors, resources, tactics and skills are also defined. According to Fligstein, actors in fields are jockeying against each other in a game to maintain and improve their positions. In addition, the leader would apply their sources to push the others’ work. In addition, the group leader has also allocated the resource to the different actor in the collective in the manipulation. Besides that, the actions play different roles in the cooperation to find out different interests each different member. Therefore, the theory has outlined the framework to the reporting practices.
Section4: Research material and methods are also demonstrated. 1.5hours interview each is applied in the research. The sample size of the interview is 65. These participants are contributions to management accounting processes between parent companies and subsidiaries. The questions are also designed in the process of the discussion. Though sample size is small, the actual performance should be deeply investigated. From the interview, the relationship between group and subsidiaries are also explored in the reporting practices.
The case studies are conducted between Ebel and two of its subsidiaries: BCE and Ronelec, the relationship between them is also explored.
The appointment of the CEO is quite important for the company as the collective group leader. The CEO’s KPI (key performance indicators) is fully linked to the financial performance of the company. Two sets of the reporting practices are designed for different audience. In the collective, they are working together as the central role of the CEO, to meet the requirements of the reporting practices with the relevant accounting standards. This difference is a deliberate attempt to show that additional control requires a potentially negative impact on profitability. By expanding the scope of the report to the cost of the report itself and by exaggerating the costs, BCE executives say that any additional reporting process would necessarily affect the combined profits. Therefore, Ebel's interlocutors need to strike a balance between their wishes to achieve further reporting requirements and necessary protection conditions to collect high levels of profits from subsidiaries. BCE executives limit further reporting requirements by providing their interlocutors to Ebel, and the information indicates that their interest is not implementing additional control mechanisms.
Because they have been listen to the messages from the periphery, they realize, and is often BCE executives to remind, should not be the pursuit of the most advanced reporting procedures, and damage to the unit's ability to provide a good economic performance. Strategies such as providing "de-reporting" and "action" encourage BCE leaders to compromise with the hierarchy, which is worth preserving and is an acceptable new procedure. Finally, the interaction between the parent company's leadership and subsidiaries defines the cooperation conditions for performance reporting operations.
Group leaders’ social skills consist of taking other actors’ interests into account. Successful cooperation relied on the actors’ adhesion to share value and objectives. Based on the agency theory, the manager would like to maximize managers’ own interests rather than shareholders, so that agency theory could well explain the reporting manipulation practice. In addition, reporting manipulation practice still relied on the members’ experiences and interdependence, because their attitude could be contributed to the collective activities. It suggests that group leaders’ social skills are not intrinsic capacities but the result of regular exposure to other people’s reasoning, interests, fears, comments, etc. For this purpose, the group leader’s social skill could reflect on the actors’ interests and activities on the reporting practices.
The article is examining the relationship between the parent company and subsidiaries from the theoretical respective. In the central, the collective group leader applies their source to motive the actors to take part in the activity. In addition, the group is acted as cross-level cooperation to act their own interests in the reporting practices.
As a consequence, the article is explored the motivation of the reporting practices from the respective of the group leader and actors based on the Fligstein’s theoretical framework on strategic action fields (SAFs), also interviews and case study are also applied in the research.